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A checkers-like model game with a simplified set of rules is studied through extensive
simulations of agents with different expertise and strategies. The introduction of comple-
mentary strategies, in a quite general way, provides a tool to mimic the basic ingredients
of a wide scope of real games. We find that only for the player having the higher offensive
expertise (the dominant player), maximizing the offensive always increases the proba-
bility to win. For the non-dominant player, interestingly, a complete minimization of the
offensive becomes the best way to win in many situations, depending on the relative
values of the defense expertise. Further simulations on the interplay of defense exper-
tise were done separately, in the context of a fully-offensive scenario, offering a starting
point for analytical treatments. In particular, we established that in this scenario the
total number of moves is defined only by the player with the lower defensive exper-
tise. We believe that these results stand for a first step towards a new way to improve
decisions-making in a large number of zero-sum real games.
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1. Introduction
Expertise and strategy are the keystones for many sports. Expertise has to do
with the degree of ability that a single player or team has, in order to perform
an offensive or defensive move. Strategy is a rule that associates a player’s move
with the information available to him at the time when he decides which move to
choose (Haurie and Krawczyk [1998]). Now consider a real zero-sum game such as
baseball, football or volleyball. These are strategic games (Lam and Laung [2007]),
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since the teams (for simplicity called players from here on) choose their average
performance, i.e. more offensive or more defensive actions, once and for all and
simultaneously. This happens when a particular line-up (and therefore a particular
strategy) is chosen at the beginning of every match, thus defining one of the many
possible particular balances between defensive and offensive performance along the
match. A common belief on strategy, particularly in the context of simple games,
is expressed with the adage “the best defense is a good offensive”. In this work we
test this belief through the construction of a properly designed checker-like model
game.
Checkers is a table game that occupies a very fundamental place in game
theory for an important reason: it is the most complex game ever solved
(Schaeffer et al. [2007]). It has been proved by extensive numerical calculations that,
for two checkers players making no wrong moves, the game always ends in a draw.
Indeed, checkers have been in the center of an intense research concerning machine
learning and artificial intelligence since the beginning of 1950s (Schaeffer [1997]).
The computational proof that checkers is a draw (Cho [2007]), highlights the promis-
ing use of specialized algorithms in statistical calculations of checker-like model
games, and reinforces its conceptual similarity to many apparently dissimilar games
at first glance, such as team sports like baseball, football, etc. Therefore the use
of checkers as a model game, with the smaller quantity of ingredients needed to
develop a general phenomenology, is a well based approach. The study of simplified
game models allows to better generalize statistical results to near-connected games,
as well as to physical and economic processes (Haurie and Krawczyk [1998]). With
this aim, we have built a smart program that extensively simulates a variant of the
checkers game, looking for easily generalizable regularities that are impossible to
asses with more specific game designs.
Extensive statistical explorations have proved to be a valuable and consistent
way to establish game properties, and validate usual assumptions in game theory
(Aucamp and Eckardt [1986]; Rodriguez [2006]; Ribeiro et al [2013]). We perform
such exploration in our model game implementing a complementary strategy, that
is likely to mimic real games in a general way. In the complementary strategy
scenario, a single value is defined to indicate the balance between the offensive
and defensive performances, in such a way that players cannot maximize both at
the same time. Thus, we ran simulations looking for optimal values in the whole
range of possible strategies, considering arbitrary different expertise values (both
defensive and offensive) between opponents. As a result, we find that the common
belief on maximizing offensive is only true for what we call the dominant player, i.e.
that of the highest offensive expertise. For the non-dominant player, maximizing
offensive can have in some cases the opposite effect depending on the defensive
expertise values. This proof is of remarkable interest, not only as a useful prospect
for guiding decision-making, but also because it highlights the importance of a
reliable assessment of the expertise prior to the selection of the strategy.
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The fact that the best strategy is non-trivial for the non-dominant player, raises
the role of the defensive expertise. We thus addressed the isolated effects of defensive
expertise in a purely offensive scenario, as a starting point for a further analytical
treatment of the simple model game. In this extreme situation, several quantities
were found to be instrumental for both time-dependent and time-independent game
observables. In particular we find the quantitative relation of the defensive expertise
value with the total time length of the match, the growing of advantages and the
distribution of even sequences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next Section 1.1 we introduce
the model, its particular features, and the definition of the offensive and defensive
expertise. In Section 2 we present and discuss the main results of the work, con-
cerned with the complementary strategy implementation. In Section 3 we focus on
the effects of defensive expertise through the study of the fully-offensive scenario as
an extreme case. Section 4 is devoted to the general conclusions of the work.
1.1. Model
The simulations are done on a standard checker scheme: twelve pieces for each
player in a conventional board of 8 × 8 sites, the half of which may be occupied.
In the same way, the capturing procedure and the criterion to finish the game,
were implemented as in standard checkers (Fortman [2010]). However, in contrast
to the standard rule according to which moves are only valid in the two forward
diagonal directions, here we allow moves in the four diagonal directions (provided
the nearest site is empty). Two further simplifications were considered: only one
capture is allowed for a single move, and the king crowning is forbidden. The match
starts randomly with one of the two players, and the turn to move alternates in
the following, until one of them runs out of pieces and his opponent becomes the
winner.
Each player i, with i ∈ {1, 2}, has two associated values representing his defen-
sive expertise d and offensive expertise o. We will refer to them as di and oi, and
both are continuous variables ranging from 0 to 1. Defensive expertise di stands
for the capacity of player i to avoid menaces, if any: when a defensive move is re-
quested for player i, he will look, with a probability di, for menaced pieces, and
(in case there exist) move one of them to avoid the menace. Correspondingly, the
offensive expertise oi stands for the capacity of player i to perform captures. Once
an offensive move is commanded to player i, he will check, with a probability oi, if
some opponent piece can be captured, and if so he will make the move.
Figure 1 shows the decision tree corresponding to the defensive and offensive
moves. Note that if di = 0, player i will perform random moves whenever a defense
move is requested; while if di = 1, he will then evaluate the menaces and avoid
them whenever it is possible. Any value in between 0 < di < 1 means that the
player will avoid menaces with probability di, or move randomly with probability
1− di. Analogously, a player i with oi = 0, asked to move offensively, will actually
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Fig. 1. Decision trees corresponding to the defensive (left) and offensive (right) moves.
move randomly; while if oi = 1 the player will always capture an opponent piece,
provided there is a piece to capture. For 0 < oi < 1 this player will evaluate (and
perform) captures with probability oi or move randomly otherwise.
The particular choice a player makes in every turn, that is, the choice of perform-
ing a defensive move, an offensive move, or any other, is governed by its strategy.
In this way, the input of its expertise and strategy completely defines how a player
performs in a match.
2. Complementary strategy
The motivation behind the complementary strategy can be easily understood if we
go back to our baseball game example. Prior to the beginning of the match, a line-
up of nine individuals has to be chosen among the whole team, this line-up, aside
from minor changes, will be kept throughout the match. As we already pointed,
this is equivalent to the choice of a particular strategy. In a good approximation,
one can consider that the line-up with the best offensive performance is not likely
to be the same as the one with the best defensive performance. Indeed, individuals
conforming the team are generally specialized in one of the two performances. In
this way, a particular line-up maximizing the offensive performance will minimize
the defensive performance, and vice versa.
For our model game, we define the complementary strategy as a number 0 ≤
θ ≤ 1 according to which in every turn a player i makes an offensive move with
a probability θi, or a defensive move with a probability 1 − θi (see fig. 2). At the
beginning, each player is provided with a fixed value of θi that remains constant
throughout the match. We notice that, with this definition, for θi = 1 or θi = 0 the
complementary strategy corresponds to a pure strategy, while otherwise it becomes
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a mixed strategy.
Fig. 2. Decision tree corresponding to the complementary strategy.
When using the complementary strategy, the winning rate of the players strongly
depends on the particular choice of θ1 and θ2. For a fixed set of expertise values
{o1, d1, o2, d2}, we fix the strategies θi and simulate 10
5 matches with different
random seeds. We then change the strategy to a new value in steps of ∆θ = 0.05,
exploring all the range of θ between 0 and 1. The outcome resulting from the
statistical treatment of the data is used to draw the winning matrices corresponding
to the given set of expertise values.
Fig. 3. Wining matrix for two different sets of expertise values. Left: d1 = d2 = 0.75 and o1 =
o2 = 0.75. Right: d1 = 1, o1 = 0.25 and d2 = 0.25, o2 = 0.75. In each panel, strategy θ1 grows
from bottom to top and θ2 grows from left to right; red (blue) intensity indicates that player 1 (2)
has the highest winning rate.
In a winning matrix, every row (column) represents a specific value of the strat-
egy θ1 (θ2), which corresponds to player 1 (2). A given element of such matrix is
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calculated as the difference between the number of matches won by player 1 and
those won by player 2. In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 the value of the matrix elements has
been normalized and represented in the form of a temperature map, ranging from
-1, which is indicated by dark blue, to 1 corresponding to dark red. In this way,
red (blue) intensity indicates that a match under these conditions is more probably
won by player 1 (2). The white color means that the winning rate is the same for
both players.
As can be seen from figure 3 (left), the winning rate for players with the same
expertise values increases as the strategy becomes more offensive. This matrix is
representative of those games in which players have the same expertise values. Un-
der this condition, the common belief concerning the maximization of the offensive
is indeed the best strategy, i.e., θi = 1. Furthermore, for the player with the high-
est offensive expertise, all further outcomes consistently showed that this offensive
maximization leaded to the highest winning rate. In other words, if oi ≥ oj then
the best strategy for player i is always θi = 1. In the following, the player with the
highest offensive expertise is called the dominant player.
In the case presented in figure 3 (right), we can appreciate that the offensive
maximization strategy is the best choice not only for the dominant player (player
2), but also for the non-dominant player (player 1). Notice, from the last column
of the winning matrix in figure 3 (right), that even when the dominant player can
statistically ensure the winning by choosing θ2 = 1, the non-dominant player 1 can
still expect to improve his odds by setting θ1 = 1. However, as we show below, for
the non-dominant player, this offensive maximization is not an universal recipe of
improvement.
The exploration of a wide range of non-equal expertise values, revealed a fur-
ther richer scenario concerning the best strategy for the non-dominant player. In
figure 4 (left) a representative case is shown, where player 2, with winnings in
blue, is the dominant player. Consequently, it is always possible to select a strategy
θ2 = 1 for which the winning rate favors player 2, no matter which strategy player 1
chooses. However, in this case, the non-dominant player has better odds at winning
if he chooses a strategy which maximizes his defensive performance. This type of
situation is non-trivial, and its implication for decision-making is remarkable. In
this situation, for instance, if a non-dominant baseball team (player 1) decides to
maximize its defensive performance, the dominant team (player 2) will be forced
to fully enhance its offensive performance in order to slightly tip the balance in his
favor. Actually, player 1 has the freedom of setting a strategy θ1 ≤ 0.5 to reach
the same goal, since the matrix values are virtually the same in this range. Fig-
ure 4 (right) shows the example of a case in which the match behaves roughly in
the same way for all possible strategy values of the non-dominant player.
In order to recreate these situations presented in figure 4, a necessary condition is
that the defensive expertise d of the non-dominant player has to be larger than that
of the dominant player. Thus, even though the dominant player (defined through
his offensive expertise) can always find a strategy that favors his winning rate,
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Fig. 4. Wining matrix for two different sets of expertise values. Left: d1 = 1, o1 = 0.5 and d2 = 0.25,
o2 = 0.75. Right: d1 = 0.75, o1 = 0.5 and d2 = 0.25, o2 = 0.75. In each panel, strategy θ1 grows
from bottom to top and θ2 grows from left to right; red (blue) intensity indicates that player 1 (2)
has the highest winning rate.
the shape of the matrices is largely influenced by the role of defensive expertise
values. While the winning matrices in figure 3 (right) and figure 4 (left and right)
correspond to the same dominant player d = 0.25; o = 0.75, the best strategy is
different for each of the three different opponents. Moreover, in the three cases the
dominant player has to face very different challenges: in the situation presented in
Fig. 3 (right), he has to adopt a strategy value larger than that of the opponent;
in the situation presented in Fig. 4 (right), he has to adopt a strategy value larger
than about 0.6; and in the situation presented in Fig. 4 (left) he has to adopt a full
offensive maximization.
In terms of real game scenarios, these translate into very tough situations, since
the assumption that all values of the strategy are equally accessible is almost never
the case in real sports. As one of many examples, the dynamics of a baseball tourney
makes it impossible to keep the same line-up from one game to the next, thus
dramatically restricting the available values of θ. In this common situations the
knowledge of the winning matrices may be crucial in planning a long term behavior.
3. Role of defensive expertise: fully-offensive strategy
In order to better understand the effect of defensive expertise, in this section we
implement the fully-offensive strategy, as an artificial extreme case. In this scenario,
the offensive expertise values are fixed at the maximum value, i.e., o1 = o2 = 1, while
the range of defensive expertise d1 ≥ d2 is carefully explored. The fully-offensive
strategy, shown in Fig. 5, consists in a fixed algorithm for every move and is exactly
the same in both players: on each move, the players will always capture a piece
provided there is one to be captured, or make a defensive move otherwise. This
July 31, 2018 11:35 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE v11
8
capture at the beginning of the tree in Fig. 5 allows to equally neglect the influence
of the offensive performance. Although this strategy is an artificial extreme case,
and does not correspond to any real game format, we show it is very useful to study
the isolated effects of the defense expertise.
Fig. 5. Decision tree corresponding to the fully-offensive strategy.
We carried out simulations for opponents with defensive expertise
d ∈ {0, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. For each combination we ran up to 106 matches in order
to have a suitable statistics. In the fully-offensive frame, matches with d1 = d2 = 1
are quite difficult to end, since the players move avoiding menaces whenever they
appear, thus producing a dramatic increase in the length of the match as the board
becomes less occupied. We do not account for this particular combination of exper-
tise values in our study.
The analysis in fully-offensive strategy was divided in two sections devoted to
the study of time-dependent and time-independent behaviors. Time t is represented
here by the sequence of moves, in such a way that a move of player 1 plus a move of
player 2 are two units of t. In the time-dependent study we focused in the total time
of the matches τ , and the material advantage v(t) (Ribeiro et al [2013]), defined as
the difference between the number of pieces of player 1 and player 2. The time-
independent study focused in the length of even sequences L, also measured in
number of moves.
3.1. Time-dependent properties
In the left panel of figure 6 we have plotted histograms for the total time of the
matches τ , for several combinations of expertise values. Interestingly, when the
lowest expertise (d2) is the same, all the histograms collapse into a single, well-
defined curve. In other words, the distribution of total time τ is independent of
the value of the highest expertise. Thus, the total time of a single game can be
completely described in terms of the worst player, and his defensive expertise value
d2 is the only relevant parameter influencing the behavior of games in terms of
length.
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Fig. 6. Left: Histograms of the total time τ for several combinations of expertise d1 ≥ d2. Partially-
filled symbols represent matches where the lower expertise is d2 = 0, for void symbols d2 = 0.5
and for open symbols d2 = 0.75. Right: Averaged advantages for the initial stages of matches with
several combinations of expertise values. Collapse of the averaged advantage with t∆d.
The mean total time of the matches increases by increasing d2, as can be observed
from the shift to the right in the histograms of figure 6 (left). This increase does not
happens in a trivial way, but accompanied of a marked increase in the dispersion
and keeping relatively constant the value of the lower limit of the histograms. That
is to say, the better the worst player is, the more difficult it is to predict the length
of a single match. On the other hand, the lower limit in the histograms of total
time, is associated to the fact that there is a minimal number of moves needed to
capture all the pieces. This number is about τmin ≈ 30, corresponding to 2.5 moves
per piece in average.
The calculation of advantages v(t) was performed by the simple difference of
pieces of player 1 (+1) and pieces of player 2 (−1) at every time (turn) of the
match. By definition, when v > 0 (v < 0) player 1 (2) has more pieces than player 2
(1). With the aim of statistically studying the way in which advantages departs from
zero, the average 〈v(t)〉 over the realizations is done only for initial times t ≤ τd1,d2min ,
so including the total number of matches at every time t. The behavior of 〈v(t)〉
can be seen in the right panel of figure 6 for several values of combinations d1 6= d2.
In figure 6 (right) a collapse is obtained by plotting the averaged advantage as a
function of t∆d, where ∆d = d1 − d2. Thus, the mean advantages behaves linearly
with time, and its growing speed is determined just by the difference in defensive
expertise between the two opponents.
3.2. Time-independent properties
The length of even sequences L is the time span of a single value in the advan-
tage v, i.e. a sequence of moves in which equilibrium establishes. It is computed
without taking into account the quick alteration of two consecutive (and opposite)
captures. In that case advantage suddenly returns to its previous value and it may
be interpreted as an exchange, in analogy to well-known plays existing in many
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Fig. 7. Left: Histograms of the length of even sequences in matches between opponents with
the same expertise. The inset is a logarithmic scaling of the y-axis in order to remark exponential
behaviors. Right: Collapse of the distributions of the length of even sequences with the functionality
(1) for all values of d1 and d2. The graph corresponds to the best collapse with α = 0.65.
In figure 7 (left) one can see the distribution of L for matches between opponents
of equal expertise. While the more probable sequence is around L = 1, it is evident
that the higher the expertise is, the higher is the probability of finding larger lengths
in the game. Clearly, one expects that good players sustain larger even sequences
than bad players. This rather intuitive behavior appears in a wide variety of real
games.
The exponential decay of the length distributions is another feature that can
be seen from the inset of figure 7 (left). This behavior is ruled by an expertise-
dependent exponential factor P (L) ∼ e−λ(d1,d2)L that does not depends on the
expertise difference ∆d. One natural assumption is to consider λ as a function of
the mean expertise 〈d〉 = (d1 + d2)/2 through the form
λ(d1, d2) ∼ (1− 〈d〉)
α . (1)
In figure 7 (right) the data of length distributions is collapsed with this functionality.
The value α = 0.65 produced a good collapse over several decades for all the values
of d1 and d2 tested in this work. In this way, the length of even sequences can
be explained in terms of the mean expertise of the opponents. The latter shows
the existence of another quantity through which defensive expertise mediate the
behavior in the fully-offensive approach.
4. Conclusions
We have presented an extensive numerical study on a simple model game with
zero-sum. This type of game covers a wide scope of real sports for which a system-
atic study of the interplay between expertise and strategy has not been definitely
addressed. With this motivation we implemented a complementary strategy that
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maximizes the offensive performance by minimizing the defense performance, and
vice versa, in a continuous way. This approach emulates real situations as, for ex-
ample, the choice of a particular line-up from a baseball team. Far from simplicity,
our model demonstrate that there is a rich scenario concerning winning expecta-
tions, that can be visualized through the winning matrices. The winning matrix
is constructed by statistical simulations and allows the identification of the best
strategies in a number of different scenarios.
Our results suggest that the common belief that “the best defense is a good
offensive” is only true for the dominant player. For the non-dominant player the
best strategy to adopt is strongly dependent on the four expertise values (defensive
and offensive of the two players) and usually is that of minimizing offensive. For
decision makers this is a valuable knowledge since the evaluation of expertise in real
games can be done prior to the selection of a strategy. This result makes a direct
connection to the subject of decision-making based on reputation, which is rarely
considered in game analysis (Lam and Laung [2007]; Mui et al. [2002]).
Finally, a fully offensive strategy was also studied with the aim of quantitatively
addressing the influence of defensive expertise in an isolated context. Statistical
simulations of games between opponents of different expertise values showed that
the total length of the matches was determined only by the value of the expertise
of the worst defensive player. The growth of advantages was proportional to the
expertise difference between the opponents, and the distribution of even sequences
was determined only by the average expertise through an exponential law. We
consider these last results as a first step for a further analytical systematization.
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